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WILLS-REVOCATION BY MARRIAGE WHERE WILL MAKES NOMINAL
BEQUEST TO EACH HEIR NoT MENTIONED--Testatrix provided in her will
that she intentionally omitted all of her heirs not specifically mentioned, "intending thereby to disinherit them," and provided further that "any such persons, or
heirs, or any devisees or legatees" contesting the will should receive $1.00. She
married after making the will, and this is <!- petition by the surviving husband
to determine heirship. He claims an intestate share of the estate by virtue of a
statutory provision that marriage revokes a will as to the surviving spouse "unless provision has been made for the spouse by marriage contract, or unless the'
spouse is provided for in the. will, or in such way mentioned therein as to show
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an intention not to make such provision." 1 The lower court held that the husband was provided for in the will to the extent of $ 1 .oo, and that the will was
therefore not revoked by marriage. On appeal, held, reversed; testatrix apparently had in contemplation only the persons who at the time of execution of the
will could conceivably be heirs or potential heirs. There is no claim that testatrix and contestant were engaged to marry, or even acquainted at the time the
will was executed, so testatrix cannot be said to have provided for her afteracquired husband or to have mentioned him in such a way as to exclude him.
In re Axcelrod's Estate, (Cal. 1944) 147 P. (2d) I.
The rule that a will is revoked by marriage dates from ecclesiastical law,
where marriage plus birth of issue were held to work a revocation of a man's will
on the basis of a presumed intention brought about by the appearance of a new
heir. 2 Marriage alone revoked a woman's will because a married woman had no
testamentary capacity and hence was unable to revoke a will made before marriage.8 This doctrine of implied revocation has been adopted and expanded by
many courts in this country, and statutes in most states now provide for the effect
of marriage on a prior will.4 Since the theory of the doctrine and the statutes is
that a complete change in testator's circumstances makes the will inadequate, the
result of this case is both sensible and logical. At the time of making the will,
testatrix apparently was not contemplating marriage, so that the word "heirs"
cannot be said to include the man she afterwards married. Once ,accepting this
view of the situation, it is clear that she did not mention him or pro:vide for him
in such a way as to prevent the statutory implied revocation by marriage. The
court distinguishes an earlier California case, Estate of Kurtz,S in which testator
gave $ 1 .oo to "any person whomsoever" who might contest the will and married
the day after executing the will. It was held that this language was sufficient to
disinherit the spouse. The court in the principal case distinguishes the Kurtz
case on the basis of the broader testamentary language used there, plus the fact
that it was evidently made in contemplation of marriage, but t;he concurring
opinion advocates overruling the Kurtz case.
Elizabeth Durfee*

Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, 1941) § 70.
Marston v. Roe, 8 Ad. & EI.- 14, II2 Eng. Rep. 742 (1838).
8 Hodsden v. Lloyd, 2 Bro. C.C. 535, 29 Eng. Rep. 293 (1789).
4 In general on the subject of implied revocation of wills, see Graunke and
Beuscher, "The Doctrine of Implied Revocation of Wills by Reason of Change in Domestic Relations of the Testator," 5 Wrs. L. REV. 387 ( 1930); Durfee, "Revocation
of Wills by Subsequent Chang~ in the Condition or Circumstances of the Testator," 40
MrcH. L. REv. 406 ( 1942).
5 190 Cal. 146, 210 P. 959 (1922).
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